‘It is Historically Constituted’ by Honkanen, Katriina
www.ssoar.info
‘It is Historically Constituted’
Honkanen, Katriina
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Honkanen, K. (2005). ‘It is Historically Constituted’. European Journal of Women's Studies, 12(3), 281-295. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1350506805054269
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-224832
‘It is Historically
Constituted’
Historicism in Feminist Constructivist
Arguments
Katriina Honkanen
ÅBO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT This article explores the historicism of feminist constructivism. It
focuses on the work of Judith Butler, and explores how the idea of history and
elements of temporality are used in her theory of materialization. It argues that the
radical historicism implied in the Jamesonian request ‘Historicize!’ can become a
self-defeating enterprise. The hypothesis is that historicism has been used as a
kind of ‘black box’ in feminist constructivism. The article points out the way in
which constructivists rely much too easily on history as evidence, and talk about
history as if it stands outside construction. This ambivalence in constructivist
thought is prevalent. The article proposes that feminist theorists of materiality
recognize the predominance of self-evident notions of historicity in constructivist
theories and start practising a strategic forgetting of history.
KEY WORDS Judith Butler ◆ constructivism ◆ feminist philosophy of history ◆
form–matter distinction ◆ historicism ◆ strategic forgetting of history
History has become a commanding meta-narrative, perhaps the meta-
narrative in Western discourse. (Ermarth, 1992: 20)
I believe, indeed, that we are all suffering from a consuming fever of history
and ought at least to recognize that we are suffering from it. (Nietzsche,
1983: 60)
Historicizing and rewriting histories are usually considered necessary
and positive operations in an academic setting. To treat concepts or objects
ahistorically, or to write universalizing historical narratives, is considered
a negative thing. When discussing an object or concept, a sense of
epistemological certainty is achieved by referring to the historical
specificity of it. Also, constructivist theories often refer to the historicity of
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constructions; anything that has a history is contingent and thus
constructed. To understand the meaning of an object often requires
knowledge about its history and its historical emergence. In other words,
the present state of things is explained through the historicity of meaning.
Our understanding of sexuality, for instance, is explained through inves-
tigating how meanings of sexuality were historically produced. I point at
these tendencies, which I have encountered, to indicate the epistemologi-
cal value that historical knowledge – this consuming fever of history – has
gained in feminist thinking. It is my wish to contribute to a feminist theo-
rizing of issues in relation to historicity1 (Colebrook, 1996, 1997; Ermarth,
1992, 2001; Felski, 2000; Irigaray, 1999). In this article, I propose that it is
the epistemological hegemony of historicist constructivism that enables
the predominant state of theory within feminism. As a feminist construc-
tivist and epistemologist myself, I want to discuss the meta-narrative
status that history has gained. I claim that feminist constructivist argu-
ments depend on such aspects of historical thinking that are otherwise
problematized by feminist epistemologists. One of these aspects is foun-
dationalism, with another being universalism.
To make my point, I discuss the ways in which historicity is used in
feminist theories, especially Judith Butler’s constructivist theories, to see
where and how the idea of history stands as a ground for knowledge, as
this is one of the most powerful undertakings of the word ‘history’.
Generally, there are different uses of the term ‘history’ in feminist theo-
rizing. First, history can be understood as meaning being about the past.
History can also be seen as representing the past and the things that
actually happened there. The strongest usage of the word ‘history’ implies
an understanding where history has happened and is for real. On the other
hand, history can be understood as fully discursive. How is history used in
feminist constructivist arguments and what makes these usages effective
in particular arguments? The different uses of ‘history’ imply different
textual purposes.
My interest in theorizing constructivism in relation to historicity stems
from the observation that the debate about the usefulness of poststruc-
turalism for feminist epistemologies often concerns the nature and depth
of historicity, and not historicity as such. The debate often focuses on
whether phenomena should be seen as situated in history or constituted by
history. For example, is ‘matter’ to be understood through its situatedness
in a history that lies ‘outside it’, as a context, or should ‘matter’, in a
Butlerian sense, be studied in such a way as to show how historicity
constitutes matter? What is under debate here is the depth and reach of
construction (see, for instance, Butler, 1993; Carlson, 2001; Kirby, 1997).
The question that constantly pops up is ‘are things fully, or thoroughly
constituted, or are there remainders of non-constituted constancies?’
It is especially in relation to materiality and the ‘constructedness of
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materiality’ that the place and nature of historicity should be rethought.
Butler is concerned with ‘unsettling’ an understanding of matter where
matter is presumed and operates as a foundation for meaning (Butler,
1993: 30). I welcome this unsettling and want to broaden its space by ques-
tioning the place of historicity in relation to matter. Feminist construc-
tivists who attempt at unsettling ‘matter’ should be wary about using
historicity as a ‘black box’.
Some work has been done within feminist theory that attempts to
rethink the constructivism with which feminism has operated (Braidotti,
2002; Butler, 1993; Carlson, 2001; Cheah, 1996; Fausto-Sterling, 2000;
Grosz, 1994; Schriempf, 2001; Vasterling, 1999). One of the key issues here
is a call for a return to the biological roots of the body, or to materiality,
and a simultaneous effort not to anthropologize the whole issue of
constructivism (Cheah, 1996; Irigaray, 1999). Instead of bypassing the
materiality of bodies, these theorists have wanted to look at not just the
meanings and ideologies that categorize bodies, but also at bodies them-
selves. In spite of the feminist critique of essentialism there is, in the main-
stream of science, a neo-deterministic and discriminatory trend (Braidotti,
2002: 137) in attempts to ‘return to biology’.2 In my view, feminists need
to historicize the ways in which matter has been understood. Historiciz-
ing becomes problematic only when it becomes self-evident and when the
place of historicity (and discursiveness) is fixed in relation to matter as that
which ‘constitutes or effects matter’.
Against this background, I take a closer look at some of Judith Butler’s
constructivist arguments, which are widely cited and used within
feminist theory. Moreover, I argue that in current feminist theory there is
a tendency to collapse constructivism into history. This limits the possibil-
ities for thinking about change. A rethinking of discursiveness and
materiality, as simultaneous processes, is hindered by a historicism that
privileges the force of discourse in its relation to matter and materiality
(Irigaray, 1999). Thus, unquestioned historicism also has consequences for
theories of corporeality.
THE FORM–MATTER DISTINCTION
Within different constructivist theories, historicity is a central part of
theoretical argumentation. As an example of this, one can consider Judith
Butler, who argues that ‘history is constitutive of discourse itself’ (Butler,
1993: 282), or Rosi Braidotti, who argues that history is ‘a destiny for
everybody’ (Braidotti, 2002: 41). In feminist accounts that use historicity,
there are two ways of understanding history. The first is to understand
history as a form affecting the meaning of matter in different ways yet still
leaving matter the same. For example, when history is seen to affect the
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meanings attached to women’s bodies. The second is to understand
history as constitutive of matter. For example, when history is seen to
constitute the materiality named ‘women’s bodies’. In that case, the
process of materialization is seen as a historical process, making matter (in
a Butlerian sense). The first line of argument understands history to be a
concrete material phenomenon, ‘the past’ that is given a certain form
through the writing of history. The materiality of history, or the past, is
unchangeable, whereas the narratives and forms given to it are variable.3
In the second line of argument, historicity predates matter.
An example I wish to use in this article is the sentence ‘Women in
Finland got the vote in 1905’. Particular historical sentences, such as this,
can be read as consisting of true statements concerning what has
happened in a particular context in the past. It can be argued that this
sentence is performative in its capacity to produce a textual meaning as a
part (prop) of my argument in this text. The problem with the above
sentence is that it is a ‘false description of facts’. The correct sentence is as
follows: Finnish women got the vote in 1906 (Manninen and Setälä, 1990).
The materiality of history, or the event (1906), is unchangeable whereas
the narratives and forms given to it are variable.
In the second line of argument, historicity predates matter. History in
this case is made of sets of norms, or intelligibilities and is in a sense
equated with ‘meaning’ (in general). It consists of sets of powers that are
formative of matter and that operate through materialization. In this case,
historicity is there before the ‘vote’ and even the chronology, which
enables the entity ‘1906’ to appear, is historically constituted.
To be able to better understand the complex relationship between
materiality and historicity, I use the form–matter distinction as a tool in
my discussion. Concerning this Judith Butler writes:
We might historicize the Aristotelian notion of the schema in terms of
culturally variable principles of formativity and intelligibility. To under-
stand the schema of bodies as a historically contingent nexus of
power/discourse is to arrive at something similar to what Foucault
describes in Discipline and Punish as the ‘materialization’ of the prisoner’s
body. (Butler, 1993: 33)
Schema means form, shape, figure, appearance, dress, gesture and
grammatical form. Butler states that matter never appears without its
schema, its form. In this sense, Butler opposes a notion of matter where it
is seen as something that is just there, awaiting varying forms. What is
notable is that Butler historicizes the form. The historically contingent
formative level is a materializing power. Is history there ‘before’ any
matter, enabling materialization? What is this history ‘composed of’? If
the form is historical, then the materialization, or the formation of matter,
is also historical. Butler’s constructivist argument further states that
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feminists should not take materiality as an irreducible phenomenon,
rather they should conduct a critical genealogy of its formation (Butler,
1993: 32). This genealogy of formation is a history of form(ation). In order
to broaden the feminist critique of essentialist accounts of materiality, I
propose that the place of history in relation to matter is problematized. I
also suggest that, for the sake of conceptual clarity, the materiality
involved in our notion of history should be investigated.
One interesting aspect in the relationship between these two uses of the
form–matter distinction, which I have just described, is that they use the
same ‘source material’. In the first case, the concrete materialities of
the past, events, acts, changes and continuities are seen as ‘historical
material’ that is ‘about the past or from the past’. The second line of investi-
gation, the line of ‘materialization’, also needs its historical and empirical
objects, be it that these are read as instances of materialization or of a social
constitution. The second approach also needs to use empirical objects that
are ‘about the past’ or ‘from the past’, even if these might now be those
invested in present bodies ‘carrying the past in them’. In both cases, history
is formative: either history is conceptualized as a way to form narratives
based on past materialities, or it is conceptualized as a way to account
for/narrate the formation of matter. It seems that the same tool is utilized for
telling different stories about construction. The same grammar rule can be
used for different purposes. Placing the word in another sentence has
effects. From the ontological point of view, the tool is the same: the historical
being of objects. There have to be objects that ‘carry history’, that in their
very being are historical. Historicity should be rethought at its ontological
level in order to make a difference (Laclau, 2000: 183).
CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE FIELD OF HISTORY
For the language of history to be useable for either positive or negative
purposes, it has to be connected to the real or the ‘empirical’ in one way
or another. Full-blown narrativism that denies this connection evacuates
some of the political force that history is invested with. This is to say, it
questions history as history, making it another form of literature. I think
theorists of materiality should think through the interconnectedness
between materiality and historicity. This is helpful in theorizing the
connections between the discursive and the material.
Within the field of history, it is possible to talk about either the construc-
tion of facts (or knowledge?) or the construction of objects and materiali-
ties. It is possible to make a distinction between on the one hand, social and
historical facts that are constructed, and, on the other hand, ‘brute facts’, or
physical facts (natural laws, phenomena) (Carlson, 2001: 112; Hacking,
1999: 23). What is interesting here is that historical facts are usually
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considered constructed in the sense that they are based on temporal facts
– the events that are seen to have happened. The brute facts of history are
the ‘events’ and the fact that they ‘happened’ (‘the vote’). What is also
asserted is the ‘chronology’ (1906), the fact that time goes forward and
cannot be reversed. I wish to bring into consideration my question that
whether postmodern or not, historians honour the ‘brute facts’ by
adhering to strict methods of investigations, including such aspects as
source criticism and epistemological discussions. History cannot be
narrated without a connection to the ‘real’ – to events. My perspective,
where the relationship between historicity and materiality is problema-
tized, highlights, of course, the empirical foundations of the historians’
work. I think that the foundational aspects in the way that feminists think
about history also reside in these ‘brute facts’, in chronology and in the
events that are connected to ‘history as the past’. I think feminist construc-
tivist theorists need to highlight the empiricism to which history is
connected in order to be able to further think through the problematics
involved in the connections between the discursive and the material.
Historical objects can be conceptualized as constructed in the sense that
they are ‘made’, ‘crafted’ or ‘formed’ by past human agents, but to under-
stand their historicity as constructed and to question them for being brute
facts from the past, is usually considered a kind of unbelievable ‘irreal-
ism’.4 Within the historians’ world, this is an area that constructivism
cannot enter, without becoming an absurd antirealism:
If there is any appeal of Realism which is wholly legitimate it is the appeal
to the commonsense feeling that of course there are tables and chairs, and
any philosophy that tells us that there really aren’t – that there are really
only sense data, or only texts, or whatever, is more than slightly crazy.
(Putnam, 1995: 163)
This commonsense realism concerning the ‘there is’ (tables and chairs), also
has its historical dimension in the ‘there was’. The commonsense feeling
about there being chairs is as commonsense as being concerned with the
fact that, of course, there ‘has been’. The meaning of chairs can vary, but the
materiality of chairs is a brute fact with a historical dimension. The materi-
ality of the chair, or with my example, ‘1906’, is a foundation and, the
empirical nature of history as a science relies on this foundation.
There is an ongoing debate within the field of history, where post-
modernist historians are seen to stand for the possibility of this kind of
antirealism, denying the reality of Napoleon, ‘1906’, the Berlin Wall, the
Holocaust and so forth.5 It is my attempt to try to understand this debate
in order to advance poststructuralist feminist thinking about historicity. I
think it is a telling example of the clash between historical empiricism and
constructivist arguments. The empiricist historians consider objects real
and historical in their physicality or materiality (for example, a pair of
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sandals found in Luxor – ‘Tutankhamen’s sandals’ – which are kept in the
Egyptian museum in Cairo). The historicity of objects is considered to be
a part of the real. It is one thing to state that the meaning of an object is
constructed (the meaning of the sandal), which is upholding a construc-
tivist epistemology, but it is another thing to endorse constructivist argu-
ments on an ontological level (the sandal as a physical object). Are one’s
claims for constructivism ontological or epistemological? There is a possi-
bility for slips between these levels (Hacking, 1999: 29; Vasterling, 1999:
19), where one shifts from talking about ideas to talking about objects and,
I think it is the source of a lot of confusion. Consider the following denial:
The materialities, which phenomenologically appear to us as referents
outside the semiotic, are not real objects, but rather truth-effects. (Chou-
liaraki, 2002: 92–3)
Statements like this seem absurdly antirealistic for the empiricist historian
if they are understood to be about the material reality (ontology) of
historical objects (about the sandal as an object). The argument denies the
materiality of objects and, for a historian, this would amount to a denial
of the materiality of past events and a denial of the possibility for real
events (there are no sandals). The difference between real events and
illusionary events can be drawn in a way that becomes devastating to the
writer of history. If I want to write history, I cannot give up the material-
ity and historicity of the sandal. When feminists use historicity to make
constructivist claims, they should think through the materiality that
historicity implies. If feminists, on the other hand, argue that all histories
are narrations, they should, for instance, clarify how narrative history
manages to ‘constitute discourse itself’ (Butler, 1993). Within historio-
graphical debates, ‘antirealist constructivist’ arguments are usually ques-
tioned by examples from some trends in historical revisionism, especially
‘holocaust denial’ (Iggers, 1998: 112; White, 1987: 76–82, 230). Are we to see
the Holocaust as a truth effect? If one were to write a book titled The Social
Construction of the Holocaust, or, using my example, The Social Construction
of 1906, what would such a book be about (see Hacking, 1999: 4)?
I think that these complex issues and the problem of the historical real
should be thoroughly theorized and taken seriously. It can be claimed that
materiality always comes with a form. However, I can also argue that
historicity is enabled by materiality, as historical narratives need material
‘props’ that are labelled ‘empirical’. They need these to become referential
and factual. Materiality is not solely constituted by historicity and theoriz-
ing. I do think that ‘Tutankhamen’s sandals’ are a real materiality and one
that I use as a ‘prop’ in this, my narrative about historicity. For a feminist
theorizing of materiality, this means that we need to question the power of
historicity and analyse the ways in which historical narratives use
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materiality. It is important to prevent feminist accounts where the historical
forms thrive on a ‘silencing of matter’, as Luce Irigaray (1999) has written.
THE NECESSITY OF HISTORICITY
History is everyone else’s and hence also women’s destiny. (Braidotti, 2002:
41)
When the practice of historicizing is seen as a universally legitimate way
to ground knowledge claims, all disciplines in an interdisciplinary scien-
tific setting have become/are historical. What does it mean to see histori-
cal requirements as a destiny for ‘everyone’? What theoretical necessity
turns history into ‘norms’, ‘expectations’ and ‘power’?
This historicist-constructivist argumentation is so frequently repeated
that it is taken for granted. Consider historicity in the following as an
example of this self-evidence:
If post-modern-feminist critique must remain theoretical, however, not just
any kind of theory will do. Rather, theory would be explicitly historical,
attuned to the cultural specificity of different societies and periods and to that
of different groups within societies and periods. Thus the categories of post-
modern feminist theory would be inflected by temporality, with historically
specific institutional categories such as the modern, restricted, male-headed
nuclear family taking precedence over ahistorical, functionalist categories
like reproduction and mothering. Where categories of the latter sort were
not eschewed, they would be genealogized – in other words, framed by a
historical narrative and rendered temporally and culturally specific. (Nichol-
son and Fraser, 1999: 114; my emphasis)
The language of history is predominant in this argument. Theory should
be explicitly historical, the categories used should be historically specific
and ‘ahistorical’ categories should not be used unless framed by a histori-
cal narrative. The emphasis that I have added to this quote highlights the
necessity to read historicity as a language and, also, to question its
function in constructivist arguments. In my reading, there seems to be
nothing but history and temporality upholding this particular demand for
good feminist theory. The argumentation relies on history and is firmly
situated within history. It is clear, here, how history is understood as a
form, imposed on matter and capable of ‘freeing’ matter from functional-
ism (causality) and, of course, from ahistoricism (biologism, naturalism,
determinism). This is certainly an example of what Linda Hutcheon
referred to with her statement that:
One of the effects of post-modernism is that it reinstalls historical contexts
as significant and even determining. The paradox of the post-modern is that
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it simultaneously problematizes the entire notion of historical knowledge.
(Hutcheon, quoted in Heise, 1997: 14; Ermarth, 1992)
The text by Nicholson and Fraser argues for a theory that is explicitly
historical. For a theory to be explicitly historical, the categories that it uses
must be contextualized historically. This means that according to this very
model, every feminist theory is historically specific except for the theory of
historical specificity. The theory of ‘historical specificity’ is not a histori-
cally specific theory. It becomes a method of constructivism and a univer-
salizing rhetorical device.
I suggest that the necessity of historicity is also connected to a certain
metaphoric use of history. In a metaphoric use, the question is not
anymore about finite and particular narratives, i.e. histories, but, rather
about the historicity of meaning. As an example, consider Butler when she
argues for ‘materialization’ in favour of ‘social construction’:
What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a
return to the notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a process
of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effects of
boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter. That matter is always material-
ized has, I think, to be thought in relation to the productive and, indeed,
materializing effects of regulatory power in the Foucaultian sense. (Butler,
1993: 9–10)
Here, Butler refers to matter as a process instead of as a surface or a site
that is influenced by history. To conceptualize matter as a process of
materialization means that one has to investigate this process. The notion
of matter is reconceptualized and historicized. It is historicized through
the notion of form, through keeping the form–matter distinction operative
and rendering ‘form’ historical. The ‘process of materialization’ is thus a
historical process, where the ‘regulatory power’, the norms (that also are
referred to as regulatory schemas, regulatory power), are seen as historical
forms that materialize and stabilize over time (this is ‘the Foucaultian
sense’). Matter always comes with a meaning. To matter is to mean (that
matter) and it is this meaning that in the end is formative, it is made of
historical form (history here also guards against linguistic monism,
whereby everything would be only and always language; although
history is a language itself, it can be used in this way).
To summarize: feminist constructivist theories can argue through
recourse to historical events and the presumption about the material reali-
ties of the past, as was the case in the example taken from Nicholson and
Fraser. Second, feminist constructivist theories can argue through
recourse to the historicity of meaning without reference to actual histori-
cal events in the ordinary sense. In both usages, history as a mode of
thought and as a language enables the constructivist argument.
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TEMPORALITY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM: JUDITH BUTLER’S
‘ALWAYS ALREADY’
In this section I use Judith Butler’s theorizing as an example of construc-
tivist rhetoric. I do this because her valuable constructivist language is
widely cited by and useable for feminist theoreticians and should, there-
fore, be elaborated upon. When Judith Butler offers a critique of the
prevailing ideas concerning woman, feminism, power, solidarity and the
subject, the use of temporal expressions becomes most frequent. It is in
instances of refuting a certain universality or essentialism, naturalism and
these unquestioned and, thus, seemingly fixed notions or ideas that Butler
relies on temporal terminology, such as ‘from the start’, ‘pre’, ‘before’,
‘always already’, ‘in advance’, ‘never’. Here are some examples of the
way that Butler uses temporality in her arguments: ‘the “I” who would
select between positions is always already constituted by them and the
positions that the “I” claims must be given in advance’; ‘Agency is always
and only a political prerogative’; ‘Subjects who institute actions are them-
selves instituted by prior actions’; ‘Sex does not describe a prior material-
ity, but produces . . .’; ‘Identity categories are never merely descriptive’;
‘The cultural context is already there as the disarticulated process of the
subject’s production’ (Butler, 1995: 42, 43, 46, 50). I have paraphrased
Butler here to show what kind of arguments I have considered in my
discussion. What is notable in these sentences is that ‘constitution’ and
‘construction’, or ‘production’, are often articulated together with the
temporal notions ‘always’, ‘already’, ‘prior’, ‘in advance’.
As I see it, Judith Butler challenges prevailing ideas about ‘woman’,
‘agency’ and so forth, through claiming that these have other meanings
because they have a temporal ‘pre’ or ‘before’. This other temporal location
sets meaning in motion and also renders phenomena historical.
Usually ‘always’ means ‘at all times’ and ‘already’ means ‘before this
time’. Following from this, ‘always already’ would mean ‘at all times
before this time’. What is further notable is that ‘already’ is connected to
the past, whereas ‘always’ is connected to the eternal or infinite.6 With a
combination of these meanings and usages, I argue that chronology is a
central reference point in Butler’s constructivist argumentation. Hence,
the combination between chronology and constructivism should be theor-
ized (for more on this, see Honkanen, 2004) to broaden the scope of
feminist constructivist argumentation.
For Butler, (past) meaning is always part of the constitution of the
subject in its making and the (past) meaning is reworked in its present iter-
ation. Actually, the temporal ‘before’ is embedded in the eternal or infinite
‘always already’, regardless of any finite historical totality. The ‘before’ is
‘always already’ present in the articulation of meaning. The logic, or
formal account of the mechanisms of construction where the ‘before’
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‘always already’ has to be in the ‘now’, operates regardless of its particu-
lar place in history. The fact that the ‘new’ – or the present – is always
implicated in the ‘old’ – the before – is not considered to be a historically
contingent fact. The old is in the new, the before is in the now. The tempo-
rality invested in the formal account of the mechanism constructivism is,
in this sense, ahistorical (which is not to be confused with the non-
historical as the ahistorical is grounded in a radical historicism).7 It is this
kind of formality that feminists should consider when using elements of
temporality. These formal elements have to be theorized and thought
through by feminists who attempt to change and transform constructivist
thinking.
If one problematizes historicizing within constructivist theories, it is on
the level of nows, befores, afters, on the level of events, notions of
‘happening’ and the temporality of ‘acts’: historicizing hides the minute
empiricism that temporality implies. The ‘constitutive moment’ is under-
stood as an empirical event because the moment has the character of the
temporal now. The moment can be put into a chronology because it is ‘of
time’, because it is datable, locatable and measurable, it is real, it is ‘1906’.
In this way one can see the empirics and the materiality that a notion of
time implies. It seems to me that chronology materializes time and history.
Chronological order involves an idea of the ‘before’ of the present (the
past) – and the ‘after’ of the present (the future). Simple succession would
mean indistinguishable instants (Ricoeur, 1985: 53). Chronology is the trick
that manifests the ‘real real’ as minutely empirical, as measurable instants
that follow one another. Conceptualized as events, dates, or years of the
past (the stuff of history – ‘1906’), chronology is used as the empirical
material that historical narrative is built upon. Chronology is easily
conflated with an objective, measurable time. Chronology, as it is
commonly used, refers to the quantitative aspect of time (Lindroos, 1998:
11–12).8
Chronological order is stronger than simple linear succession. Linear
succession can change direction without losing its character of linearity.
Chronology implies a stricter arrangement of events in the order that they
have occurred. A chronological order, when used in historical narratives,
is causal – the first thing leading to the next and not the other way around.
The theory of materialization when so influenced by historicizing con-
structivism, poses the question whether feminists universalize chronol-
ogy without acknowledging and problematizing this.
A STRATEGIC FORGETTING OF HISTORY
I call my own counter-approach to historicism ‘virtual non-historicity’.
This figuration describes the space of a feminist philosophy of history. It
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is a place that follows from feminist philosophies of history in their habit
of strategically forgetting history. Feminist philosophies of history share
an interest in problematizing historicity. Conceptualizing historicity as
self-evident and necessary is opposed to my project of a strategic forget-
ting of history. Virtual non-historicity is a feminist response to the
demand to always historicize. Methodologically, virtual non-historicity
implies a deconstructive reading of historicist texts. A deconstructive
reading traces the possibilities and places for ‘outsides’, it seeks to find the
textual places where history or historicity is used as foundation – else-
where. A deconstructive reading pauses at places where historicity
becomes unresolvable. Virtual non-historicity is sceptical towards the use
of history and understands historicity as problematic in itself.
A strategic forgetting of history is a feminist answer to historicism.
Historicism requires that history always be remembered. This way it
operates as a stop-sign, hindering transformation and new theoretical
insights. Historicism leads to a temptation to repeat and speak in the
language of history. A strategic forgetting of history is a major methodo-
logical tool that enables virtual non-historicity and a feminist philosophy
of history.
The possibilities that a strategic forgetting of history enables become
clear in relation to feminist theories of materiality. In theorizing construc-
tivism and materiality, feminists gain from entering a virtual space. In
theorizing materiality, it is essential to question the place of historicity in
order to be able to broadly think towards transformation. In theorizing
materiality, some feminists (Butler, Grosz, Irigaray, Braidotti, to name just
a few) attempt to deconstruct the form–matter distinction. In theorizing
the form–matter distinction, forgetting history means that ‘the formative’
is not prioritized by referring to the existence of ‘historicity’ and to the
historicity of the form and its capability to ‘constitute matter’ without
explicating the content and place of ‘historicity’. To me, this means a
widening of the space for feminists to continue theorizing materiality.
When theories of corporeality need historicity to support the con-
structivist argument about the historical constitution of matter, the room
to theorize bodies and materialities without historicity is delimited. To
think about materiality in a space of ‘virtual non-historicity’ becomes
suspect and might even be accused of essentialism. I want to defend the
possibility to forget history at strategic theoretical places in order to
widen the scope of constructivist theorizing. Within a historicizing
setting, a strategic forgetting of history, in times where materiality is
theorized, is impossible. Every thing has to be thought of as being firmly
inside the fixity of contingent, historical and contextual meanings. This
kind of thinking hinders a deconstruction of the form–matter distinction
and upholds the distinction by prioritizing the form, the discursive and
the historical.
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NOTES
1. With historicity, I refer to a mode of thought that enables the entity history
to become an object of science, for instance, or to become a personal invest-
ment, or a shared horizon of reality, or a narrative. Historicity is part of the
way we think. At times I have chosen to write the language of history, the
grammar of history or the word history. I do this to highlight the fact that I
analyse rhetoric. What are the rules of grammar that control the intelligibil-
ity of the word ‘history’ and what are the limits of this language in the
particular text under analysis (for example, Judith Butler’s theory of ‘the
performative’ in excitable speech)? I use the word ‘word’ to distance myself
from the heavy reality-effect that the ordinary understanding of the word
‘history’ carries.
In my usage, the word history refers to the different ways in which
historicity, the historical part of our thinking, is made use of (White, 1987).
‘History’ refers to accounts that are told or written within historicity, within
the language of history. All different histories are enabled by historicity as a
mode of thought. The word history also refers to an understanding of
history as the past. With the word ‘historicizing’, I refer to practices of
knowledge construction within historicity. Historicizing is a set of tech-
niques used to construct histories. This use of the word ‘historicizing’
departs from the ordinary grammar of the word. Usually, historicizing is
used to talk about ‘taking into account the historicity of a phenomenon’, or
when ‘accounting for’ the historicity that a phenomenon is thought to have.
2. For example, there have been several attempts to understand history
through Darwinism and evolutionary theory in the recent debates on the
‘H-History and Theory’ email discussion list. One can also see a psycholo-
gizing trend. For all the discussion logs, see www.historyandtheory.org/.
History and Theory also published a theme issue on the implications of evolu-
tionary theory for historical scholarship. See History and Theory (1999). For
an example of evolutionary perspectives on history, see Landon (1999). See
also, Fitzhugh and Leckie (2001), for a discussion of the implications of a
‘biological turn’ for the understanding of history.
3. Hayden White has theorized the forms that historical narratives take and
the content embedded in narrative forms (White, 1987).
4. The historical object is usually considered empirical in one way or another.
The documents that are used as sources have to be empirical in the sense of
being material. The events – the objects of study – are considered to be
empirical; they must have happened and they must be considered real. The
empiricism or fundamental materiality and physicality of objects is already
historical.
5. See, for instance, Iggers (1998: 112); Kellner (1995); Megill (1998: 8–9);
McCullagh (1998) and History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History
(Vol. 40(4), 2001).
6. Butler’s frequent use of terms such as, from the start, in advance or prior to,
always already and always and already, permanent or process hints at the
centrality of eternity and infinity in constructivist argumentation.
7. I read this as an operationalization of the idea of time as a flow of now-
points, now-points that are ‘of chronology’. In this sense, temporality is an
operationalization of chronology whenever it implies causality and
whenever temporality implies an irreversible order of the succession of
events (see Honkanen, 2004).
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8. Elsewhere I have argued that a notion of ‘cairological’ time is more compat-
ible with Judith Butler’s theoretization than chronology (see Honkanen,
2004).
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